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Abstract 
Recent theoretical research has studied extensively the link between wage setting and monetary 
policymaking in unionized economies. This paper addresses the question of the role of 
monetary uncertainty from both an empirical and theoretical point of view. Our analysis is 
based on a simple model that derives the influence of monetary uncertainty on unionized wage 
setting. We construct an indicator of monetary policy uncertainty and test our model with data 
for the G5 countries. The central finding is that monetary policy uncertainty has a negative 
impact on nominal wage growth in countries where wage setting is relatively centralized. This 
result is consistent with recent theoretical approaches to central bank transparency and wage 
setting. 
 










Can ambiguous monetary policy create jobs? Recent theoretical work has argued that monetary 
uncertainty may have some positive effects when it influences the behavior of other 
macroeconomic players. Accordingly, monetary uncertainty may lead to wage restraint and 
hence to lower inflation and unemployment. If labor unions can not be certain how their wage 
setting behavior will affect the central bank’s behavior, they tend to be less aggressive and 
more cautious in formulating wage demands. According to this argument, risk averse labor 
unions take into account that increased wage demands could lead to a higher variance of 
inflation and employment when the central bank’s reaction is less predictable. Therefore, 
ambiguous monetary policy reduces wage inflation if wage setting is coordinated. This 
theoretical argument has so far not been scrutinized empirically.  
In the present paper it is analyzed whether and when wage effects of monetary ambiguity may 
exist. The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we derive an indicator of monetary 
policy uncertainty based on the conditional variance of an equation explaining the short-term 
interest. Second, we use this indicator of monetary policy uncertainty and test its influence on 
nominal wage inflation in the G-5 industrial economies (US, France, Japan, the UK and 
Germany).  
It is found that higher monetary policy uncertainty has a significantly negative effect on wage 
inflation in the continental European economies and in Japan. No disciplinary effect was 
detected in the data on the UK and the US. Based on the theoretical model, we argue that this is 
due to a lower degree of wage coordination in the latter countries. In other words, highly 
centralized unions realize that their wage demands affect the overall wage inflation and 
therefore monetary policy more strongly. Thus, the degree of monetary policy uncertainty 
should have a stronger impact on more centralized labor markets. While Germany, France and 
Japan can be considered as relatively coordinated, this is not the case for UK and US, which 
are characterized by more atomistic labor markets.  
The results presented in the paper stand in contrast to the recommendations derived in another 
part of the literature on the optimal degree of transparency in monetary policy making. Most of 
the literature is concerned with the ability of financial markets to correctly anticipate moves of 
the monetary authority. The main argument is that transparency increases the effectiveness of 
monetary policy as it improves the market participants’ understanding of the intentions of the 
central bank. It also increases the credibility of monetary policy and makes it easier for the 
central bank to communicate its decisions and to explain changes in its behavior or why it has  
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failed to meet its goals. In terms of policy recommendations, the present paper does not 
postulate that monetary policy making ought to be as ambiguous as possible. But it provides a 
theoretical argument and some empirical evidence that it may also be suboptimal to be as 
transparent as possible. In other words, we would like to provide a word of caution to those 
monetary policy commentators that argue in favor of utmost transparency. After all, there may 
still be a role for "creative ambiguity" in monetary policy making.  7
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1. Introduction 
Can ambiguous monetary policy create jobs? A recent theoretical literature argues that more 
monetary uncertainty reduces trade unions’ incentives to claim higher wages (Sorensen, 1991, 
Grüner, 2002a, 2002b). According to this theoretical argument, risk averse labor unions 
internalize that increased wage demands could lead to a higher variance of inflation and 
employment when the central bank’s reaction is less predictable. Therefore, ambiguous 
monetary policy reduces wage inflation. This theoretical argument has, however, not been 
scrutinized empirically so far. In the present paper we use a simple estimation procedure in 
order to analyze whether and when wage effects of monetary ambiguity may exist. We 
construct an indicator of monetary policy uncertainty and test its influence on wage inflation in 
the G-5 industrial economies (US, France, Japan, the UK and Germany).  
We find that higher monetary policy uncertainty has a negative effect on wage inflation in the 
continental European economies and in Japan. We are unable to detect such a disciplinary 
effect in the UK and the US. One possible explanation for this, supported by the theoretical set 
up that we develop in Section 2 of the paper, is the different degree of wage coordination in the 
economies considered. More centralized unions internalize that their wage demands influence 
monetary policy more strongly, and therefore the degree of monetary policy uncertainty should 
have a stronger impact on more centralized labor markets. While Germany, France and Japan 
can be considered as relatively coordinated, this is not the case for UK and US, which are 
characterized by more atomistic labor markets (Hargreaves Heap 1994, OECD 1994).  
The role of the degree of transparency in monetary policy decisions has recently received 
considerable attention in the theoretical literature. Most of the literature is concerned with the 
ability of financial markets to correctly anticipate moves of the monetary authority. The main 
argument is that it increases the effectiveness of monetary policy as it improves the market 
participants understanding of the intentions of the central bank. It also increases the credibility 
of monetary policy and makes it easier for the central bank to communicate its decisions and to  
8
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explain changes in its behavior or why it has failed to meet its goals (see Blinder et al. 2001, 
Geraats 2002).  
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) instead have made the case for so called „creative ambiguity“, 
arguing that only unanticipated monetary policy can be effective. Given that rational 
individuals anticipate the reaction of the central bank, monetary policy becomes powerless 
except in reaction to shocks. Focusing on the role of asymmetric information, Cukierman 
(2000) and Jensen (2002) have argued that the desire of the central bank to be transparent can 
be counterproductive. By sending too many signals (bits of information) to the public and the 
financial markets, they may create excessive volatility in the financial markets. In order to 
avoid these strong movements, the central bank may be forced into inactive behavior. 
Likewise, Sorensen (1991) has argued that uncertainty may have some positive effects when it 
influences the behavior of other macroeconomic players. According to Sorensen’s argument 
monetary uncertainty may lead to wage restraint and hence to lower inflation and 
unemployment. Recently, Grüner (2002a) has also focused on the influence of uncertainty 
about the central bank’s behavior on macroeconomic outcomes. If labor unions can not be 
certain how their wage setting behavior will influence the behavior of the central bank, they 
tend to be less aggressive and more cautious in formulating wage demands. We build on the 
second approach and address the question of the role of monetary uncertainty from both a 
theoretical and an empirical point of view.  
The paper is also related to recent theoretical research work on the link between wage setting 
and monetary policymaking in unionized economies. Focusing on the characteristics of the 
central bank, Skott (1997), Sorensen (1991), Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Guzzo and Velasco 
(1999), and Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001) have studied the impact of monetary policy and 
labor market institutions on macroeconomic outcomes. Here the main issue has been whether a 
conservative, i.e. highly inflation averse, central bank should be preferred over a liberal, i.e. 
employment concerned, central bank. These papers partly invalidate the standard Rogoff 9
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(1985) result that a conservative central banker is welfare increasing for the economy when 
labor markets are decentralized. Considering the case of highly centralized wage setting, a case 
can be made that liberal central bankers might discipline inflation averse labor unions because 
unions fear too strong an inflationary response by the liberal central bank.
1 
To our knowledge, there exist only few empirical approaches to the question of how the central 
bank characteristics influence the wage setting behavior of unions. Grüner (1995) is one 
contribution that takes into account that both the monetary authority’s and the trade union’s 
characteristics affect wages and prices. More recently, Cukierman and Lippi (1999) have 
analyzed how the degree of decentralization of wage setting and central bank independence 
affect inflation and unemployment. They find that at low levels of central bank independence, 
the hump shaped relation between unemployment and wage centralization postulated by 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) can be confirmed but that this relation disappears at higher levels 
of central bank independence.  
Chortareas et al. (2001) analyze empirically a specific type of transparency, namely the 
publication of inflation forecasts and other forward-looking indicators. Performing an analysis 
in a cross-section of countries, where they relate the details of central banks’ forecasts with the 
inflation rate, they find that, after controlling for a number of institutional characteristics, an 
increase in the forecast detail is associated with lower average inflation.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we develop the theoretical framework 
for studying the effect of monetary policy uncertainty on wage setting. Section 3 discusses the 
construction of an empirical indicator for monetary policy uncertainty. The impact of this 
uncertainty on wage inflation is analyzed in Section 4. The last section summarizes the main 
findings and discusses their policy implications.  
                                                 
1 The important assumption is the inflation aversion of labor unions. For a micro foundation of 
this inflation aversion, see Berger et al. (2004).  10
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2. A Simple Model of Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Wage Setting 
Building on Sorensen (1991), we present a simple model of the interaction between various 
sectoral trade unions and a single central bank which helps to understand the impact of 
monetary uncertainty on wage setting under different degrees of trade union centralization. We 
consider an economy which is populated by n unions that interact with the monetary authority. 
All unions simultaneously fix their nominal wage demands, taking the expected rate of 
inflation into account. After this, the monetary authority sets its policy and employment is 
determined according to a given labor demand schedule. 
Let the demand for labor in sector i be given as  





L 1,  
(1)
 
where L is the total labor supply in the economy.
2 Total labor demand is given as  
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The objectives of the labor union in sector i are given as  
2
2
i i i u
A
w U − − = π . 
(5)
 
Hence, we assume that labor unions are concerned with maximizing the real wage of their 
members in the respective sector. They are also averse to unemployment in their sectors. The 
relative weight unions place on the employment aim is 
2
A
, which is assumed to be the same for 
all labor unions.  
The central bank’s objective function in turn is given as  
[ ]
2 2 u I C + − = π .  (6)
 
The central bank aims to hold inflation at zero and avoid unemployment. The inflation aversion 
of the central bank is measured as I. Inserting (3) in (6) and optimizing with respect to its 












The central wage reacts to the average wage demands in the economy with an increase in the 
rate of inflation,  1 b ≤ . It is instructive to look at some special cases of I: For I = 0, b will be 
unity, i.e. there is a full pass-through of wage setting to the inflation rate. For I = 1, b will be 
one-half. Finally, for I = ∞, b equals zero, i.e. wages have no impact on inflation.  
This reaction of the central bank to the behavior of the labor unions is what we consider to be 
uncertain for the labor union. The reaction of the central bank is uncertain if the central bank is 
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nontransparent, unions form expectations about the banks reaction to their wage setting. This is 
given as  () b b E ˆ =  and  ()
2
b b Var σ = .  
Taking these properties of the expected central bank behavior into account, the unions’ 
objective function can be rewritten, in expected values, as  
() () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣





w b w E U E i i i . 
(8)
 
This leads to  
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(9)
 
where we have made use of the fact that  ()
2 2
b
2 b ˆ b E + σ = . 
In a symmetric equilibrium (wi = w = w) we find that each labor union will set a wage demand 
of  
() ( ) ()
2 ˆ 1 ˆ
ˆ
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The equilibrium wage in (10) is greater than (or in the case of one union, equal to) zero, since it 
follows from b ˆ ≤ 1 that n > b ˆ . Several conclusions can be derived from this equation. First, as 
Sorensen (1991) has already established, a decrease in the transparency of the central bank, 
which is reflected in an increase in 
2
b σ  lowers the wage demands of the labor unions since  
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The intuition for this is that greater uncertainty makes the labor union more cautious in its 
wage demands. If it can not be certain how an increase in wages will translate into monetary 13
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policy and thus, via labor demand, into employment in its sector, the union will be more 
reluctant to demand higher wages. 
Second, an increase in the number of labor unions in the economy has a positive effect on wage 
demands because  





















Here, the intuition is that with more decentralized wage setting unions internalize less the 
influence of their own behavior on the central bank’s reaction. It is clear that this effect 
vanishes in a non-stochastic environment where unions can perfectly predict the behavior of 
the central bank. Then the characteristics of the bank play no role since the unions can always 
adapt their wage demands to the central bank’s reaction. If, however, the reaction of the bank is 
stochastic it is important how many unions there are. When there is only one union, this union 
will internalize the uncertain reaction of the central bank in its wage setting. But this 
internalization effect vanishes as the number of unions increase.  
Third, one can explore the effect of changes in the number of labor unions on the influence of 
uncertainty of wage demands. This is given as  
() ( ) () ( ) ()
() ( ) () []
0
ˆ 1 ˆ
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which states that the moderating influence of uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction on 
wage demands is weakened by an increase in the number of labor unions. This is because more 
centralized unions internalize the impact of their wage demands on monetary policy, and 
therefore the degree of monetary policy uncertainty has a larger impact on more centralized 
labor markets. Thus, the model predicts that the uncertainty of central bank reaction to wages 
has a dampening effect on wage demands but this dampening effect will be less if there is an  
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atomistic labor market. These are the two hypotheses that we are going to test in the next 
sections of our paper. 
Our empirical analysis uses the variance of the expected interest rate as a proxy for monetary 
uncertainty. Our theoretical model instead uses the variance of the reaction parameter of the 
central bank 
2
b σ . Thus the model and the empirical implementation are only compatible if there 
is a positive correspondence between the variance of the policy instrument and the variance of 
central bank behavior. This is the case if the derivative of the variance of inflation (our 
monetary policy variable) with respect to the variance of the preference parameter is positive. 
As has been pointed out by Grüner (2002a) this is condition is fulfilled if 
2
b σ  is sufficiently 
small. To see this, consider that 
( )
() ( ) () []
( )
() ( ) () []
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b ˆ 1 b ˆ n A
b ˆ n A
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which is positive for ( )( ) . b ˆ 1 b ˆ n
2
b σ > − −  
Hence, for each value of b ˆ  there is an upper bound on the variance such that the relation 
between uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction parameter and monetary policy 
uncertainty is positive. 
 
3. Constructing an Indicator of Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
The first step of the empirical analysis is the construction of an indicator for monetary policy 
uncertainty. We assume that the stance of monetary policy can be proxied by a short-term 
interest rate (see Borio, 1997). As a framework for explaining short-term interest rates, we use 
the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, i.e. we include long-term interest 
rates in the explanation of short-term rates (see Balduzzi et al., 1997, Gerlach and Smets, 1997, 
Hsu and Kugler, 1997, Nautz, 2000). Unit-root testing reveals that both short- and long-term  
15
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interest rates are I(1) variables (results omitted). We estimate the relationship between these 
variables in a VECM (vector error correction model) using monthly data from 1979:1 to 
1998:12. Thus, the sample starts in the year when the ERM was formed and stops with the 
creation of EMU. This choice of the sample excludes major breaks in the monetary regime for 
these countries that may bias the results. Details about data sources are given in the Appendix. 
The results of the cointegration analysis for the two interest rate variables using the reduced-
rank method proposed by Johansen (1988) are summarized in Table 1. The second line of the 
table reports the number of lags needed to avoid autocorrelation in the residuals. Next, the two 
eigenvalues are provided. Since the smaller eigenvalue is never significant, we report trace and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics for the larger one only. We cannot reject the hypothesis of one 
cointegration vector based on a 10% significance level. The estimated cointegration vectors, 
denoted by β, and the adjustment vectors, denoted by α, are given in the next lines. 
 
Table 1: Cointegration analysis of interest rates (1979:1 to 1998:12) 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 
Lags  6  6  6 4 6 
Eigenvalues  0.07, 0.001  0.05, 0.009  0.09, 0.002  0.06, 0.001  0.05, 0.02 
Trace/Max   17.8*, 17.6*  14.4(*), 12.4(*)  22.9**, 22.3** 16.1*, 16.0*  13.9(*), 10.4 
β  1, -1.08  1, -1.00  1, -1.14  1, -1.03  1, -0.99 
α  -0.12, -0.003  -0.05, -0.003  -0.11, 0.01  -0.12, -0.005  -0.06, 0.01 
β = (1, -1) 







Notes: Only the first eigenvalue is significant. An unrestricted constant is always included in the model. The 
equations for Germany contain impulse dummies for 1981:2 and 1981:3 and for France for 1992:9 as unrestricted 
variables. In the case of the UK, the estimation period has to start in 1978:1 to get significant cointegration results. 
Critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). **, *, (*) indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
Finally, the last line contains the results of testing restrictions on β and α. In particular, it is 
tested whether the coefficient linking short-term and long-term interest rates is unity, and 
whether the long-term interest rate is weakly exogenous (see Johansen, 1992). In none of the  
16
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cases do we have to reject the hypothesis. This implies that we can compute the following 
error-correction term: 
 
ECMt = Short-run interest ratet – Long-term interest ratet (15) 
 
Since the long-term rate is weakly exogenous for all countries, we can continue modeling 
within a single-equation context.  
Next, we estimate an error-correction model for each of the G5 countries. Diagnostic testing 
reveals that the residuals are showing significant ARCH (autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity) effects. Therefore, we augment the error correction model by a 
GARCH(1,1) framework (Bollerslev, 1986) that takes account of the observed ARCH. To 
conserve space - and since we are not really interested in the actual estimation results - Table 2 
reports important diagnostic information only.  
 
Table 2: Diagnostic testing of error-correction GARCH(1,1) model 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 













Notes: ARCH is the Engle-test for ARCH effects. AC is a Portmanteau test for autocorrelation. Normality is the 
Doornik-Hansen-test for normally distributed residuals. In the case of France, Japan, and US, we had to impose a 
restriction on the GARCH coefficients to ensure stationarity. **, *, (*) indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
The first line of the table summarizes the results of the ARCH test. It is apparent that the 
GARCH(1,1) model is successful in removing the ARCH component from the equation. In 
addition, no significant autocorrelation can be found in the residuals (AC test). There is, 
however, non-normality in the residuals and if we were to undertake any inference in the model 
we would need to rely on robust standard errors (see Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). The 
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short-term interest rate, which is taken as our indicator for monetary policy uncertainty (see 
Sauer and Bohara (1995) for a different way to model monetary uncertainty).  
From Figure 1 it is apparent that the conditional variance decreases over the course of the 
sample period. Using conventional unit-root tests (results omitted), it can be shown that this 
indicator for monetary uncertainty exhibits stochastic non-stationary, or, to be more specific, it 
seems to be I(1). That the processes were on or close to the unit circle was already apparent 
from the estimation of the GARCH processes. Since the log of the conditional variance shows 
the properties of an I(1) process, and this causes problems for inference, it is prudent to map it 
into I(0)-space by computing first differences. Thus, we measure monetary policy uncertainty 
in the following as the rate of change of the conditional variance.  
 
Figure 1: Conditional variance of short-term interest rate (in logs) 
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Figure 2 plots this measure of monetary uncertainty over time. It is apparent that the series are 
now stationary. Comparing the indicators for monetary uncertainty shows that the amplitude of 
the fluctuations generally declines over time with the exception of France. As the last graph 
shows, the series for France displays large fluctuations even at the end of the sample period.  
 
Figure 2: Monetary uncertainty indicators (change of (log) conditional variance) 







































Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics of the indicator for monetary policy uncertainty.  
Table 3: Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for Monetary Uncertainty 
Indicators 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 
Means  -0.045 -0.044 -0.053 -0.032 -0.049 
Standard  deviations  1.284 0.284 0.333 0.502 0.540 
Correlation  coefficients       
France  1      
Germany  0.27  1     
Japan 0.08  -0.06  1     
UK 0.05  -0.16  0.05  1   
US  0.15 0.23 0.20 0.13 1  
19
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We find that the means of the series have a negative sign and are relatively similar in size. This 
implies that monetary uncertainty is decreasing throughout the countries in our sample, with 
the decline in Japan being the strongest and with the UK at the opposite end. Reflecting the 
behavior of the series in Figure 2, the standard deviation of France is the largest. The UK and 
the US are intermediate cases, while Germany and Japan show the lowest variations. The 
highest correlation exists between France and Germany, which may be a reflection of the 
interest rate linkage among these countries within the EMS. Most other countries do not show 
much correspondence, except for a negative correlation between UK and Germany. 
Noteworthy is the relatively high correlation coefficient of the US with all other countries in 
the sample. This underlines the importance of the US with regard to interest rate setting.  
It is unlikely that all of the conditional variance captured by our model can be directly 
attributed to monetary policy. We would maintain, though, that monetary policy can contribute 
to this uncertainty. If uncertainty per se affects wage setting, and monetary policy can influence 
uncertainty, then monetary policy will have an impact on wage setting. 
 
4. Modeling nominal wage growth 
Next, we test the influence of our monetary policy indicator in a regression explaining nominal 
wage growth. Since wages are only available as quarterly series, we shift the analysis to this 
frequency. The dependent variable wage inflation is defined as the first difference of the log of 
the wage index. All series are difference stationary according to standard unit root tests (results 
omitted). The highest average wage inflation can be observed for the UK, which also displays 
the largest standard deviation. However, absolute differences between countries tend to be 
relatively small. At the end of the sample, we find wage inflation being relatively strong in the 
US and the UK, and relatively small in Japan. This reflects the different output growth 
experience of these countries over this time period.  20
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We model wage inflation using a Phillips-curve framework. Moreover, the actual specification 
proceeds within the general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1990). The general model consists 
of four lags of nominal wage growth, deviation of actual unemployment from NAIRU (non-
accelerating inflation rate unemployment), and the monetary uncertainty indicator. The NAIRU 
is time varying and is constructed by subtracting the trend in unemployment, as measured by a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, from the actual unemployment rate series (see Estrada et al., 2000, and 
Staiger et al., 2001, for recent attempts to estimate the NAIRU). We expect that unemployment 
reduces wage growth if it is above the NAIRU. To ensure that the estimated models are 
reasonably stable over time, we reserve the last eight observations for out-of-sample stability 
tests. Starting with the general model, more parsimonious specifications were derived in a 
consistent testing down-process at a (nominal) 5% significance level.  
Table 4 contains the results of diagnostic tests, showing that the simplified models are valid 
reductions, as they are still congruent representations of the data generating process.  
 
Table 4: Diagnostic statistics of nominal wage growth models 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 
AC (1-5)  F(5,43) = 2.30  F(5,56) = 1.25  F(5,56) = 1.13  F(5,48) = 2.16  F(5,55) = 0.74
ARCH(1-4)  F(4,40) = 0.90  F(4,53) = 0.25  F(4,53) = 0.74  F(4,45) = 0.59  F(4,52) = 0.44
Normality Chi
2(2) = 0.15  Chi
2(2) = 2.46  Chi
2(2) = 4.50  Chi
2(2) = 3.11  Chi
2(2) = 0.81
Hetero F(14,33)  = 
0.71 
F(6,54) = 0.65  F(6,54) = 1.38  F(4,48) = 1.55  F(7,52) = 0.15
Chow   F(8,48) = 0.58  F(8,61) = 1.87  F(8,61) = 3.05** F(8,53) = 0.59  F(8,60) = 0.42
Instability 
uncertainty 
0.41 0.04 0.26  n.a. n.a. 
Notes: AC is an LM test for autocorrelation from lag 1 to 5. ARCH is the Engle-test for ARCH effects on lags 1 to 
4. Normality is the Doornik-Hansen-test for normally distributed residuals, Hetero is the White-test for 
heteroscedasticity (using squared values only). Chow is a Chow-test on the 8 out-of-sample observations, 
instability uncertainty is a Hansen-test for stability of the indicator for monetary uncertainty. **, *, (*) indicate 
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 21
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The only rejection of a null hypothesis in the out-of-sample Chow-test statistics occurs in the 
case of Japan. Here the main culprit appears to be the deflationary economic environment in 
Japan over the last years, which presumably causes the predictive failure.  
Table 5 contains the estimated results of the simplified models. Most models display only few 
significant effects.  
 
Table 5: Modeling nominal wage growth 1979:1 to 1998:4 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 











∆Waget-3  0.339** 
(0.080) 
    
∆Waget-4  0.290** 
(0.070) 
    






NAIRUt-1   -0.006** 
(0.001) 
   
NAIRUt-2 -0.022** 
(0.005) 
    
NAIRUt-3 0.031** 
(0.009) 
    
NAIRUt-4 -0.011* 
(0.005) 
    
Uncertaintyt -0.0009* 
(0.0004) 
   -0.0009 
(0.0011) 
Uncertaintyt-1       
Uncertaintyt-2    -0.0023* 
(0.0010) 
  
Uncertaintyt-3       
Uncertaintyt-4   -0.003(*) 
(0.002) 











SE  0.0035 0.0044 0.0028 0.0055 0.0043 
R
2  0.77 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.58 
F-test F(7,48)  = 
22.7** 
F(3,61) =     
8.88** 
F(3,61) =     
8.70** 
F(2,53) =      
16.1** 
F(4,60) =     
20.7** 
Cases  56 65 65 56 65 
Test of model 
reduction 
F(7,41) =  
1.01 
F(11,50) =  
0.89 
F(11,50) =  
0.80 
F(12,41) =   
1.53 
F(11,49) =   
1.58 
Notes: Wage data for France and the UK start in 1983. Due to the computation of out-of-sample tests, the actual 
estimation period ends in 1996:4. **, *, (*) indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 22
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Usually, we find a negative impact of the deviation of the actual unemployment rate from the 
NAIRU and a positive coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable. The time pattern of these 
effects varies from country to country, probably reflecting different labor market institutions 
and adjustment dynamics.  
Regarding the influence of monetary uncertainty, we find two groups of countries: France, 
Germany and Japan show a negative influence of the change of monetary uncertainty on wage 
setting, while we do not find such an effect in the UK or US.
3 France, Germany, and Japan are 
rather characterized by coordinated wage setting, while in the US and the UK decentralized 
and uncoordinated wage setting is more prominent (OECD, 1994, Hargreaves Heap, 1994). 
Hence, the results confirm our theoretical prior above, namely that for those countries where 
trade unions presumably take spill-over effects of wage decisions into account, monetary 
uncertainty reduces wage inflation.  
 
5. Robustness tests 
To ensure that this conclusion is robust, we conduct a number of tests: Firstly, we use an 
insample stability test to ensure that the effect of monetary uncertainty on wage growth is 
reasonably stable. The test by Hansen (1992) allows to test specific coefficients in a model for 
stability. As is apparent from the last line of Table 4, none of the test statistics are significant at 
a 5% level. Thus, the impact of uncertainty on wages is stable over time. 
Secondly, it may be argued that our wage growth equations do not adequately account for the 
effect of expected price changes and for the influence of productivity. Therefore, we compute 
omitted variable tests for these variables as a robustness check. We test two indicators for 
future inflation: A contemporaneous expected inflation rate derived from an instrumental 
variable regression with four lags of inflation and the contemporaneous value plus four lags of 
                                                 
3 The marginal significance level for the German monetary uncertainty variable is 0.053.  
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the output gap, and the contemporaneous output gap plus four lags, which can be interpreted as 
an indicator for marginal costs. To capture the impact of productivity, the current change in 
labor productivity and four lags are tested against the models in Table 5.  
In the case of France, the instrumented current inflation rate is significant at a 10% level. It 
shows a positive sign when including it in the model, while leaving all other variables basically 
unaffected. The output gap variables are not significant (F(5,43) = 1.73) and neither are the 
labor productivity indicators (F(5,43) = 1.13). In the German model, the instrumented current 
inflation rate is not significant. However, the output gap variables are significant at the 10% 
level (F(5,56) = 2.07). It turns out that the third lag of the German output gap is significantly 
negative at the 10% level. This result is neither consistent with the typical interpretation of the 
GDP gap as an indicator of marginal costs nor does it affect the estimate of our indicator of 
monetary policy uncertainty. The labor productivity variables are not statistically significant. 
(F(5,56) = 1.1625).  
Turning to the case of Japan, we find again that the current instrumented inflation is not 
significant. The same conclusion holds when including the current output gap and four lags 
(F(5,55) = 1.36). While the four lags and current labor productivity are not significant as a 
group, including current labor productivity only leads to a significantly positive outcome 
(F(1,60) = 4.85). Including this variable in the model reduces the p-value for monetary 
uncertainty to 0.052 but cannot improve on the stability properties of the model as tested by the 
out-of-sample Chow-test. In the UK, the output gap variables are not significant (F(5,48) = 
1.05) and neither is the current instrumented inflation rate (F(1,52) = 1.95). The labor 
productivity variables are not significant as a group. However, the current value is significant 
at the 10% level, and it enters the equation with a positive sign. None of these additions to the 
UK base model leads to a significant impact of monetary policy uncertainty on wage inflation.  
Finally, for the US we get a significant impact at the 10%-level for the inflation variable, 
although including it would result in a negative sign of the coefficient. Highly significant are 24
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the groups of output gap variables (F(5,55) = 6.65**) and productivity variables (F(5,55) = 
2.98*). While the output gap variables, in particular current and first lag, show reverse signs, 
the current and lagged changes in labor productivity have a positive impact on wage inflation. 
However, none of these changes lead the coefficient on monetary uncertainty to become 
significantly negative.  
Thirdly, some researchers believe that it is useful to use White’s or Andrews’ robust standard 
errors (White, 1980, Andrews, 1991) as a precaution against invalid inference, even though no 
obvious heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation has been detected. In our case, using these 
robust standard errors would lead, in all instances, to more significant estimates of the 
parameter on monetary uncertainty, without changing the general conclusion for the sample of 
G5 countries.  
Fourthly, one may question the adequacy of the expectation theory of the term structure as a 
good model for explaining short-term interest rates. An alternative would be the use of a Taylor 
rule as an explicit model of interest rate setting. Clarida et al. (1998) explain current interest 
rates by a lagged value, the current output gap, and the inflation rate one year ahead. The 
estimates for the G5 countries derived by these authors are applied to our sample period 
employing monthly data on short-term interest rates, annualized inflation, and industrial 
production. We remove the part of the variation from our interest rate series that can be 
explained by their short term estimates for the Taylor rule (without the constant). Second, we 
fit an GARCH(1,1) model with a constant in the mean equation to the interest rate residuals. It 
turns out that in all cases we find significant estimates for one or both of the main 
GARCH(1,1) parameters (α1 and β1). Third, we store the conditional variance associated with 
the ARCH models and, as before, use the change in the logarithm of these conditional 
variances as the indicator for monetary policy uncertainty. Finally, we re-estimate the models 
in Table 5 substituting the indicator for monetary policy uncertainty indicator based on the 
interest rate expectation hypothesis by this alternative.   
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To conserve space, Table 6 shows only the estimates for the monetary policy uncertainty 
indicators within the final models (omitted results available upon request).  
 
Table 6: Impact of monetary policy uncertainty derived from Taylor rules on wage inflation 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 
Uncertaintyt-i  -0.002* (i =2) 
(0.001) 
-0.004* (i =4) 
(0.002) 
-0.002** (i =3) 
(0.001) 
  
Notes: The model for Japan contains two impulse dummies (1981:1 and 1990:2) to remove 
non-normality from the residuals. As the model for France shows significant evidence of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we have applied standard errors based on Andrews 
(1991).  
 
We observe significantly negative effects of monetary policy uncertainty on wage inflation in 
France, Germany, and Japan, while we do not find significant effects in the case of the UK and 
the US. Thus, while there are slight changes in the dynamics of the models, we conclude that 
the core results outlined above are robust to the change in computing the uncertainty variable. 
In other words, our results are not particularly sensitive with regard to the specification of the 
base model for explaining short-term interest rates. However, we prefer the interest rate 
expectations hypothesis as a base model for constructing the monetary policy uncertainty 
indicator to the one using on Taylor rule estimates. Empirically, the cointegration relationship 
between long- and short-run interest rates appears to be much more robust than Taylor rules 
estimated by instrumental variable techniques. To summarize, the results of our models hold up 
quite well against these four types of robustness tests.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Extending an approach by Sorenson (1991), we develop a model that links wage setting 
behavior and monetary policymaking in unionized economies. Monetary policy uncertainty 
may have a disciplinary impact on wage growth in countries where labor unions internalize the 
influence of their actions on the monetary policy of the central bank. We test the model for five  
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countries, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the US by including an indicator of monetary 
policy uncertainty into a dynamic wage equation. Our empirical analysis is consistent with the 
view that monetary policy uncertainty may lead to wage restraint conditional on the existence 
of a relatively centralized behavior of the trade unions.  
This finding has important consequences for the design of monetary policy institutions as well 
as for the strategy of monetary policy. When wage setting is not too decentralized, monetary 
policy may increase employment by using “creative ambiguity” as argued by Cukierman and 
Meltzer (1986). Unions’ wage demands are lower if they internalize the central bank’s reaction 
to their wage demands. Our model also implies, however, that if trade unions are already very 
conscious about employment, “creative ambiguity” in monetary policy is not going to reduce 
unemployment very much.  
Further empirical research could further study the robustness of this result using alternative 
empirical indicators for uncertainty (see, e.g., Sauer and Bohara, 1995). One such possibility 
would be to use measures of how futures rates precede changes of the monetary policy stance 
as an indicator of monetary transparency (see Blinder et al., 2001). Moreover, it would be 
useful to disentangle uncertainty that arises from monetary policy itself and uncertainty that 
arises from the rest of the economic environment. Finally, the degree of conservativeness of 
monetary policy may be associated with the size of nominal wage claims. It would be useful to 
generate time varying estimates of these factors and to use them in a more encompassing 
empirical analysis.  
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 490
June 2005
References 
Andrews, D.W.K. (1991), “Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance 
Matrix Estimation”, Econometrica, 59, 817-858.  
 
Balduzzi, P., G. Bertola, and S. Foresi (1997), “A Model of Target Changes and the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, 223-249.  
 
Barro, R. J. und D. B. Gordon (1983), “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of 
Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101-121. 
 
Berger, H., C. Hefeker and R. Schöb (2004), ”Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and 
Monopoly Trade Unions”, IMF Staff Papers, forthcoming. 
 
Backus, D. and J. Driffill (1985), “Inflation and Reputation”, American Economic Review, 75, 
530-538. 
 
Blinder, A., C. Goodhart, P. Hildebrand, D. Lipton and C. Wyplosz (2001), How Do Central 
Banks Talk?, 3
rd Geneva Report on the World Economy, Geneva: IMCB. 
 
Bollerslev, T. (1986), “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity”, Journal of 
Econometrics, 31, 307-327.  
 
Bollerslev, T. and J.M. Wooldridge (1992), “Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inference in Dynamic Models with Time Varying Covariances”, Econometric Reviews, 
11, 143–172. 
 
Borio, C.E.V. (1997), The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Industrial Countries: A 
Survey, BIS Economic Papers No. 47, July.  
 
Calmfors, L. (1998), “Macroeconomic Policy, Wage Setting and Employment: What 
Difference Does EMU Make?”, Discussion Paper No. 657, Institute of International 
Economic Studies, University of Stockholm. 
 
Calmfors, L. and J. Driffill (1988), “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic 
Performance”, Economic Policy, 6, 13-62. 
 
Chortareas, G., D. Stasavage, and G. Stern (2001), “Does it pay to be transparent? International 
evidence from central bank forecasts”, Bank of England Working Paper 143. 
 
Cukierman, A. (2000), “Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in 
the Eurosystem”, Tel Aviv University, mimeo. 
 
Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi (1999), “Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage 
Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence”, European 
Economic Review, 43, 1395-1434. 
 
Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi (2001), “Labor Markets and Monetary Union: a Preliminary 




Working Paper Series No. 490
June 2005
Cukierman, A. and A. Meltzer (1986), “A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation 
Under Discretion and Asymmetric Information”, Econometrica, 54, 1099-1128. 
 
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (1998), “Monetary policy rules in practice”, European 
Economic Review, 42, 1033-1067.  
 
Estrada, A., I. Hernando, and J.D. Lopez-Salido (2000), “Measuring the NAIRU in the Spanish 
Economy”, Working Paper No. 0009, Banco de Espana, July.  
 
Geraats, P. (2002), “Central Bank Transparency”, Economic Journal 112, 532-565. 
 
Gerlach, S. and F. Smets (1997), “The Term Structure of Euro-Rates: Some Evidence in 
Support of the Expectations Hypothesis”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 
16, 305-321.  
 
Grüner, H. P. (1995), “Zentralbankglaubwürdigkeit und Insider-Macht: Empirische Evidenz“, 
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 214, 385-400. 
 
Grüner, H. P. (1999), “On the role of conflicting national interests in the ECB council”, CEPR 
Discussion Paper. 
 
Grüner, H. P. (2002a), “How Much Should Central Banks Talk? A New Argument”, 
Economics Letters, 77, 195-198. 
 
Grüner, H. P. (2002b), “Should Central Banks Really be Flexible?”, ECB Working Paper 188. 
 
Grüner, H. P. and C. Hefeker (1999), “How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in 
Europe?”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 33-47. 
 
Guzzo, V. and A. Velasco (1999), “The Case for a Populist Central Banker”, European 
Economic Review, 43, 1317-1344. 
 
Hansen, B.E. (1992), “Testing for Parameter Instability in Linear Models”, Journal of Policy 
Modeling, 14, 517-533.  
 
Hargreaves Heap, P. S. (1994), “Institutions and (Short-Run) Macroeconomic Performance”, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 8, 35-56. 
 
Hayo, B. and B. Hofmann (2003), Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus 
Bundesbank, ZEI Working Paper, University of Bonn, November.  
 
Hendry, D.F. (1990), Econometrics: Alchemy or Science?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hsu, C. and P. Kugler (1997), “The Revival of the Expectations Theory of the US Term 
Structure of Interest Rates”, Economics Letters, 55, 115-120.  
 
Jensen, H. (2002), “Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,104, 399-422. 
 
Johansen, S. (1988), “Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors”, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 12, 231-254.   
29
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 490
June 2005
 
Johansen, S. (1992), “Cointegration in Partial Systems and the Efficiency of Single-Equation 
Analysis”, Journal of Econometrics, 52, 389-402.  
 
Lippi, F. (1999), “Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters”, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 2218. 
 
Lindbeck, A. and D. Snower (2002), “The Insider-Outsider Theory: A Survey”, IZA Discussion 
Paper No 534. 
 
Nautz, D. (2000), Die Geldmarktsteuerung der Europäischen Zentralbank und das 
Geldangebot der Banken, Heidelberg: Physica.  
 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) (1994), The OECD Job 
Study: Evidence and Explanations, Paris: OECD. 
 
Osterwald-Lenum, M. (1992), “A Note With Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the 
Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics”, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 54, 461-471. 
 
Rogoff, K. (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1190. 
 
Sauer, C. and A.K. Bohara (1995), “Monetary Policy and Inflation Uncertainty in the United 
States and Germany”, Southern Economic Journal, 62, 139-163.  
 
Sorensen, J.R. (1991), “Political Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance”, Economics 
Letters, 37. 
 
Skott, P. (1997), “Stagflationary Consequences of Prudent Monetary Policy in a Unionized 
Economy” Oxford Economic Papers, 49, 609-22. 
 
Staiger, D., J. Stock, and M.W. Watson (2001), “Prices, Wages and the U.S. NAIRU in the 
1990s”, NBER Working Paper 8320, June.  
 
White, H. (1980), “A Heteroskedastic-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity”, Econometrica, 48, 817-838. 
 30
ECB





Interest rate data (monthly series): 
IMF International Financial Statistics (Short-term rate: …60b, long-term rate: …61). 
Unemployment data (quarterly series): 
Datastream 
Wage data (quarterly series):  
France: Datastream Hourly Wage Rate, All Activities, SA, in FF. 
Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt (Hourly Wage Earnings, West-Germany, 1995=100, SA 
using Census X-12). 
Japan: IMF International Financial Statistics (Wages: Monthly earnings), SA using Census X-
12). 
UK: IMF International Financial Statistics (AV Earn Prod Ind SA, 11265..CZF…). 
US: Datastream US Wages & Salaries (AR) CURA in US$, SA using Census X-12. 
Price data (monthly series) 
CPI in IMF International Financial Statistics 
Industrial production (monthly series) 
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